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The interrelationships among the formal, semi-formal, and informal credit 
demands of farm households in Vietnam
Abstract
Purpose - This study simultaneously explores the nexus among formal, semi-formal, and informal 
credit markets and farm households' credit demand determinants in Vietnam.
Design/methodology/approach - This study uses a multi-stage stratified random sampling process 
for a survey of 648 smallholder farmers in the Red River Delta, Vietnam. The trivariate probit model 
is used to address the interdependence of farm households' credit demands in different credit 
markets.
Findings - The results reveal complementary relationships among two pairs of credit markets (formal 
versus informal and semi-formal versus informal). There are dissimilarities among the determinants 
(household characteristics, household head's characteristics, credit history, and geographical factors) 
of farm households' credit demands in different markets, reflecting segmentation of Vietnam credit 
markets. 
Practical implications - The study's empirical findings are important for policymakers and credit 
providers to enhance farm households' access to credit for agriculture and to improve the 
operations of the three credit markets.
Originality/value - This is the first empirical study in Vietnam and one of few in other developing 
countries simultaneously exploring the determinants of credit demand in and interrelationships 
among all three credit markets to provide more comprehensive and accurate results.
Keywords: farm household; credit demand; trivariate probit model; formal; semi-formal; informal 
credit
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Vietnam's agricultural sector has become more and more important and irreplaceable in the 
economy and rural development. Vietnam has successfully transformed from an underdeveloped 
agricultural economy into a recognized global exporter of many agricultural products such as coffee, 
rice, and cashews. Although the development of Vietnam's agriculture is undisputable, the sector 
mainly consists of small-scale producers who cannot take advantage of economies of scale and have 
lagged behind regional and other developing countries in labor, agricultural land, and water 
productivity. Therefore, fostering a larger-scale, innovative agricultural sector is an important 
priority of the Vietnamese government and the farming community for the long-term development 
of Vietnam's agriculture (Anh et al., 2020). 
According to Moahid and Maharjan (2020), credit is a significant factor that accelerates agricultural 
development and modernization in developing countries. In Vietnam, credit enhances agricultural 
performance in both the short and long term (Anh et al., 2020). However, rural credit markets in 
developing economies, including Vietnam, are deficient, constrained, and segmented (World Bank, 
2019). Failure to correctly recognize the credit demand of farmers might be a major reason for the 
ineffectiveness of credit programs in Vietnam and other developing countries. 
Farm households were assumed to choose from three credit markets (formal, semi-formal, and 
informal) for their credit. They may have a credit demand in all three credit markets, no credit 
markets, or any combination in between. According to Chivakul and Chen (2008), farm households 
having credit demand in one credit market are defined as households who apply for credit in this 
credit market and those who are discouraged (i.e., who need credit but do not apply for a loan). A 
credit demand in one market does not exclude a demand in another credit market. In Vietnam, three 
coexisting markets provide credit to the rural sector: the formal, semi-formal, and informal credit 
markets (Khoi and Gan, 2017; Linh et al., 2019; Truong et al., 2020). The different credit markets 
have different characteristics such as loan value, interest rate, collateral, and procedures. Thus, it is 





























































International Journal of Social Econom
ics
3
important to identify the relationships among different credit markets to implement policies that 
aim to boost the integration of the credit markets to ultimately enhance the efficiency of the 
markets (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998). 
Despite the coexistence of three rural credit markets in Vietnam, the literature on the determinants 
of rural households' credit demands in Vietnam (e.g., Barslund and Tarp, 2008; Duong and Thanh, 
2015; Thu et al., 2020) mainly concentrates on one or two credit markets, which might result in 
biased estimates of credit demand determinants. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, there is 
no study that simultaneously investigates the linkages among the formal, semi-formal, and informal 
credit markets in Vietnam. This study extends the literature by simultaneously exploring the 
determinants of rural farm households' credit demands for agricultural purposes and the 
relationships among the three credit markets in the Red River Delta, Vietnam.
The study contributes to the literature in three ways. Firstly, this study provides more inclusive 
results on the linkages among the three credit markets. Secondly, this study uses the trivariate 
probit model to address the interdependence of farm households' credit demands in different credit 
markets. This study is one of few empirical studies to simultaneously explore the determinants of 
credit demands in the formal, semi-formal, and informal credit markets. Finally, the study's findings 
provide up-to-date evidence on the relationships of different credit markets and credit demand 
determinants in Vietnam. The study's results can be used by the policymakers and credit institutions 
to revise the credit policies, credit terms, or priorities to enhance credit access for farm households 
and improve the operations of the three credit markets. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on the 
determinants of farm households' credit demands and the relationships among different credit 
markets. Section 3 presents the data and methodology used in this study. Section 4 provides the 
results and discussion. Section 5 presents the main findings, policy implications, research limitations, 
and suggestions for future studies.

































































2.1. Relationships among different credit markets
In many developing countries, including Vietnam, the formal, semi-formal, and informal credit 
markets coexist (Linh et al., 2019; Truong et al., 2020). Formal credit providers in Vietnam are 
regulated and supervised by the State Bank of Vietnam (central bank), and their credit activities are 
pursuant to the credit institution law. The source of formal credit refers to commercial banks, policy 
banks, cooperative banks, people's credit funds, and licensed microfinance institutions (MFIs) (Khoi 
and Gan, 2017; Truong et al., 2020). Semi-formal credit providers do not operate under the credit 
institution law, including non-governmental organizations, unlicensed MFIs, and microfinance 
programs within mass organizations (e.g., Farmers' Union or Women's Union) or development 
projects (Truong et al., 2020). Informal credit sector includes credit providers who are unlicensed 
and provide credit that is not regulated by the state but relies on social sanctions or personal 
relationships as means of enforcement. The informal credit sources include moneylenders, relatives 
and friends, rotating savings and credit associations, pawnshops, and input suppliers (Linh et al., 
2019; Dang et al., 2019).
The linkages among different financial markets could be conceptually classified as direct and indirect 
links (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998). The direct links can be divided into the linkages in the allocation 
of credit and the linkages in the mobilization of deposits. Indirect links work through the credit 
demand relations and could be substitute or complement in nature. If two credit markets are 
substitutes, the growth of one market leads to a reduction in the other. If the two credit sectors are 
complementary, the growth of both sectors may occur concurrently.
Given the relative importance of the indirect links, previous literature mainly focuses on the 
substitution or the complement among different credit markets. In fact, the results on this issue vary 
among different studies. Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) provide evidence of low substitutability 
between formal and informal credit in countries located in the Sub-Saharan area of Africa in the 
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early 1990s. The authors explain the dissimilarities in the interest rates, size, and maturities of loans 
in different credit markets result in a negligible amount of informal loan contracts that are 
comparable to the formal credit market. In contrast, Awunyo-Vitor and Abankwah (2012) find that 
an increasing demand for formal loans by maize farmers in the Brong Ahafo and Ashanti areas 
(Ghana) does not lower their demand for informal loans. The authors show that the informal and 
formal credit sectors are complementary rather than substitutable.
In Vietnam, Saint-Macary and Zeller (2012) examine the relationship between formal and informal 
credit sectors in Yen Chau (Northern Vietnam's mountainous district). Based on the survey of 300 
farm households between 2007 and 2008, the authors find that informal and formal credit are 
imperfect substitutes. By contrast, Thu et al. (2020), who surveyed 402 poor rural households in Thai 
Nguyen province, Vietnam, conclude that the informal credit market has a complementary 
relationship and is an incentive to develop the formal credit market. 
2.2. Determinants of farm households' credit demand
Based on the literature, the factors affecting farm households' credit demand can be classified into 
four groups: household characteristics, household head's characteristics, credit history, and 
geographical factors. However, the results on the determinants of credit demand among different 
studies are inconsistent regarding credit sources, survey periods, and regions (Barslund and Tarp, 
2008; Dang et al., 2019).
2.2.1. Household characteristics
Family size: Chaudhuri and Cherical (2012) and Tran et al. (2016) assume that larger households tend 
to have lower capital available for production because of higher expenditure for consumption hence 
depend on credit. Chaudhuri and Cherical (2012) suggest that family size significantly raises the 
likelihood of households applying for formal credit, whereas Mpuga (2010) and Chandio et al. (2020) 
report no significant impact of family size.  
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Household assets: Barslund and Tarp (2008) find a significant, positive relationship between 
household assets and formal credit demand. For semi-formal and informal credit markets, Cheng 
and Ahmed (2014) show that households are more likely to apply for credit with an increase in 
household assets' value. Duong and Thanh (2015) conclude that rural households with higher house 
value have a greater probability of participating in microcredit programs. However, Barslund and 
Tarp (2008) demonstrate more total assets decrease the possibility of demanding informal credit.  
Farmland size: the more farmland, the more likely farm households demand credit to purchase 
important agricultural inputs such as fertilizer or improved seeds (Moahid and Maharjan, 2020). 
Barslund and Tarp (2008) and Cheng and Ahmed (2014) find that households with more land tend to 
apply for formal and semi-formal credit. However, Rizwan et al. (2019) show a negative farm size - 
credit demand nexus and explain that farm households having less farmland might have low income 
and low savings, thus requiring more credit to purchase agricultural equipment and inputs. 
Social status: the household head's position in the community (Pham and Izumida, 2002) is an 
indicator of a household's social capital. Social capital has an important role in fostering information 
and the exchange of ideas, decreasing information asymmetry to reduce transaction costs, and 
enhancing cooperation and the reputation of individuals (Sanchez-Famoso et al., 2013). Li et al. 
(2020) assume that a household head who is a member of the government might raise the 
confidence of a household about obtaining credit, which positively affects the likelihood of applying 
for credit. Li et al.'s (2020) results show that households with the head as a member of the 
government are more likely to apply for a loan.
Social group participation: social group participation may encourage farmers to exchange ideas 
related to alternative sources of finance, new investment projects, etc., and hence create an 
increased need for credit (Reyes, 2011). Akudugu (2012) examines the factors that influence 
farmers' demand for credit supplied by rural banks in Ghana. The author finds that participating in a 
farm-based group is likely to increase farmers' agricultural credit demands. Djoumessi et al. (2018) 
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confirm that agricultural association participation significantly, positively affects credit demand and 
credit access by smallholder farmers.
Livestock production: Pham and Izumida (2002) find that livestock production has a significant, 
positive influence on households' probability of borrowing from the Vietnam formal credit market. 
The authors explain that livestock production generates a relatively higher rate of return. Thus, rural 
farm households in Vietnam are more likely to borrow to invest in livestock production. However, 
Moahid and Maharjan (2020) conclude that livestock ownership has an insignificant impact on farm 
households' likelihood of participating in the formal and informal credit markets in rural Afghanistan. 
2.2.2. Household head's characteristics
Gender: Previous studies reveal males are more likely to have a high demand for formal loans (Zeller, 
1994; Chaudhuri and Cherical, 2012). Mpuga (2010) concludes men exhibit a higher level of credit 
demand from formal, semi-formal, and informal sources than women since men experience a 
greater chance of accessing production resources. In contrast, Dang et al. (2019) reveal women are 
positively related to the adoption of both formal and informal credit in Lam Dong province, Vietnam. 
Chandio et al. (2020) show the gender of the rural household head does not significantly affect a 
household's formal credit demand.
Age: The literature reveals mixed results of the impact of household head’s age on credit demand. 
Cheng and Ahmed (2014) and Lin et al. (2019) find a significant, negative influence of the household 
head's age on the likelihood of applying for credit. According to Cheng and Ahmed (2014), the 
elderly in rural areas often have little formal education and have fewer productive investment 
projects, leading to low credit demand. Zeller (1994) and Mpuga (2010) show the opposite results. 
Educational level: Empirical results from Mpuga's (2010) and Rizwan et al.'s (2019) studies show a 
significant, positive impact of household head's education level on formal and informal credit 
demands. Barslund and Tarp (2008) and Lin et al. (2019) demonstrate the opposite for the informal 
credit market, i.e., demand for informal credit is likely to decrease with increased years of formal 
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education. One possible explanation is that a better-educated household head is likely to have 
better access to formal credit.
Farming experience: The theoretical expectation of the effect of farming experience on credit 
demand is unclear. Farmers with more years in farming might have new ideas to improve 
productivity and need capital to realize these ideas, resulting in increased credit demand. On the 
other hand, farm households with more farming experience are likely to achieve greater efficiency, 
which generates more capacity for self-financing (Reyes, 2011). The literature shows mixed results 
on farming experience's influence on credit demand. Chandio et al. (2020) confirm that an increase 
in farming years is likely to increase a farmer's demand for credit. However, Atieno (1997) 
demonstrates farming experience significantly, negatively influences credit demand. 
2.2.3. Credit history related factors
Previous studies have examined the effect of credit history variables, including bad credit history 
(Barslund and Tarp, 2008), granted credit in the past years (Jia et al., 2010), outstanding loans (Das 
and Laha, 2017), on a farm household's credit demands. Barslund and Tarp (2008) conclude that a 
bad credit history positively, significantly affects rural households' demand for informal credit but 
does not influence the demand for formal credit. The authors explain that a bad credit history makes 
it difficult for rural households to secure formal loans. Thus, they turn to informal credit providers 
for their credit needs. Jia et al. (2010) reveal that having formal credit in the past three years has an 
insignificant effect on households' willingness to borrow from formal credit sources. Das and Laha 
(2017) show that having outstanding formal credit does not significantly affect a household's 
probability of applying for new formal credit. 
2.2.4. Geographical factors
The geographical factors that may affect a farm household's credit demands are distance to credit 
sources and regional differences. Chandio et al. (2020) discover that a long distance to financial 
institutions or credit providers has a significant, negative influence on rural households' likelihood of 
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applying for credit since the long distance increases transport costs for the loans. In contrast, Svotwa 
et al. (2020) conclude that farm household – bank distance is not significantly related to credit 
demands. For regional differences, Barslund and Tarp (2008) use dummy variables to distinguish 
provincial differences in Vietnam and find regional differences significantly impact the households' 
credit demands. 
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
This study surveyed Vietnamese smallholder farm households whose main income was from crops 
and livestock production because 70% of the gross output of Vietnam's agricultural sector is from 
crops and livestock, and most Vietnamese agricultural producers are smallholder households (World 
Bank, 2019). The survey was conducted from April to July 2020 in the Red River Delta (RRD). The RRD 
was chosen for two reasons: (1) the region contributes 14% of the national agricultural gross value-
added (NAGVA) and is among the three largest agricultural production areas in Vietnam; and (2) the 
region experiences serious land segmentation and small-scale agricultural landholdings that may 
limit farm households' access to credit (World Bank, 2019). 
This study uses a multi-stage stratified random sampling process for the survey. First, the relevant 
provinces in the region were categorized into three groups according to income (high, middle, and 
low). Next, Ha Noi, Hai Duong, and Ha Nam provinces were randomly chosen to represent the high, 
middle, and low income groups, respectively. In each province, two random rural districts were 
selected (Phuc Tho and Ba Vi districts in Ha Noi; Binh Luc and Thanh Liem districts in Ha Nam; and 
Kinh Mon and Binh Giang districts in Hai Duong). Finally, a random commune that had crops and 
livestock production was identified in each of the six districts. Overall, 750 farm households took 
part in the survey (125 farm households in each commune), resulting in 648 valid questionnaires 
(86.4%) for empirical analysis.
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3.2. Trivariate probit model 
Apart from observable factors, there are unobserved factors that could simultaneously influence 
farm households' credit demands in different credit markets. For example, farm households may 
have dissimilar judgments on the "pros and cons" of one credit market compared with the other 
options because of their understanding of the loan products or the requirements of the different 
credit markets. Thus, the decision to have a credit demand in each credit market may not be 
independently based on farm households' judgments. This could lead to the correlation of farm 
households' propensity of having credit demand in different credit markets. The correlation between 
credit demands in different credit markets implies either a substitutable (negative correlation) or 
complementary relationship (positive correlation). Failure to capture unobserved factors and the 
nexus among agricultural credit demands in different credit markets will lead to bias and inefficient 
estimates. Therefore, this study uses the trivariate probit model (TVPM) to explore the determinants 
of farm households' credit demands. The TVPM allows the determinants of credit demand in three 
different credit markets to be investigated jointly. In addition, TVPM can deal with the 
interdependence (pairwise correlations) between credit demands in any pair of different credit 
markets (Triguero et al., 2013). The coefficients of these pairwise correlations can be used to test the 
complement/ substitution relationships among the three credit markets. The specifications of the 
TVPM can be expressed as:
      (1)𝐷𝐶 ∗𝑘𝑖 =  𝜃𝑘′𝑍𝑘𝑖 + 𝜀𝑘𝑖,  𝑘 ∈ {1,2,3}
=1 if ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise (2)𝐷𝐶𝑘𝑖 𝐷𝐶 ∗𝑘𝑖 
where: k =1, 2, 3 denote formal, semi-formal, and informal credit markets, respectively;  is a 𝐷𝐶 ∗𝑘𝑖
latent variable capturing the unobserved propensity of farm household i to have a credit demand in 
credit market k;  is a binary variable indicating farm household i's observed credit demand in  𝐷𝐶𝑘𝑖
credit market k (1 if farm household demands credit in credit market k and 0 otherwise);  is a 𝑍𝑘𝑖
vector of explanatory variables (see Table 1);  is the corresponding parameter vector; and  is 𝜃𝑘 𝜀𝑘𝑖
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error term capturing the influence of unobserved factors on farm households' credit demands.   𝜀𝑘𝑖
(for k =1, 2, 3) jointly follows a trivariate normal distribution (Ramful and Zhao, 2008):
(𝜀1𝑖,𝜀2𝑖,𝜀3𝑖)′ ∼ 𝑇𝑉𝑁 (0,[ 1 𝜌12 𝜌13𝜌12 1 𝜌23𝜌13 𝜌23 1 ])                                    (3) 
The off-diagonal elements,  (for l,m = 1,2,3; l ≠ m, and ), indicate the correlation 𝜌𝑙𝑚 𝜌𝑙𝑚 =  𝜌𝑚𝑙
coefficient of  and .  captures the unobserved correlations among the error terms of different 𝜀𝑙 𝜀𝑚 𝜌𝑙𝑚
credit demand latent equations.
The trivariate joint probabilities can be expressed as (Blind and Müller, 2019):
      Prob (𝐷𝐶1 =  𝑑𝑐1𝑖 , 𝐷𝐶2 = 𝑑𝑐2𝑖 , 𝐷𝐶3 = 𝑑𝑐3𝑖 │𝑍1, 𝑍2, 𝑍3) =        Ф3 
(𝑞1𝑖𝜃1′𝑍1𝑖,𝑞2𝑖𝜃2′𝑍2𝑖,𝑞3𝑖𝜃3′𝑍3𝑖 ;𝑞1𝑖𝑞2𝑖𝜌12,𝑞1𝑖𝑞3𝑖𝜌13,𝑞2𝑖𝑞3𝑖𝜌23)                   (4)
where: dcki  =1 if farm household i has a credit demand in credit market k and 0 otherwise (k=1, 2, 3); 
= 2dcki -1;  denotes the standard trivariate normal distribution's cumulative distribution 𝑞𝑘𝑖 Ф3 (.)
function.
The model's log-likelihood function (Blind and Müller, 2019) is expressed as: 




𝑙𝑜𝑔Ф3 (𝑞1𝑖𝜃1′𝑍1𝑖,𝑞2𝑖𝜃2′𝑍2𝑖,𝑞3𝑖𝜃3′𝑍3𝑖 ;𝑅)        (5)
where: N is the number of observations; the covariance matrix R of errors has the off-diagonal 
elements =  ((for l,m = 1,2,3; and l ≠ m).𝑅𝑙𝑚 𝑞𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑚𝑖𝜌𝑙𝑚
Following Cappellari and Jenkins (2003), the Geweke–Hajivassiliou–Keane (GHK) simulator is used to 
estimate the trivariate probit model. Train (2009) argues that the GHK simulator is the most reliable 
approach to simulate normal probabilities and yields unbiased results with any given random draw 
number. Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) suggest that the GHK simulator produces consistent estimates 
when the number of draws is equal to or higher than the square root of the observed number. With 
a sample size of 648, this study set the number of draws to 50, which is well above the square root 
of the number of observations. 
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4. Results and discussion
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 summarizes the credit demands of the surveyed farm households in the formal, semi-formal, 
and informal credit markets. Most (52.93%) farm households have a credit demand (in one, two, or 
all three credit markets). Table 3 reports the statistics of the model's explanatory variables for the 
whole sample and each credit demand group. According to Table 3, households with a credit 
demand tend to have a smaller house and durable property value than the whole sample. The 
average family size, social status, socio-economic group participation, and main farm production 
vary among the different credit demand groups.
Regarding the household head's characteristics, formal and informal credit-demand households have 
a higher percentage of men than the whole sample, whereas households with semi-formal credit 
demand have women head more than the whole sample. These statistics indicate the different roles 
of men and women in demanding different types of credit. The average age of household heads with 
credit demand in all three credit markets is higher than for the whole sample, implying a positive 
relationship between the heads' age and households' credit demands. In contrast, the farming 
experience of household heads in the three credit markets is lower than for the whole sample, 
suggesting an adverse effect of farming experience on credit demand. 
The mean value of a bad credit history in all three credit markets is greater than for the full sample. 
Thus, households with a poor credit history are inclined to have higher credit demands. Table 3 
shows that the longer it takes to get to the formal and semi-formal credit sources, the higher the 
level of credit demand by the household. 
4.2. Empirical results
4.2.1. The different credit market relationships 
Table 4 shows the pairwise correlation coefficients between households' different credit demands. 
The coefficient  is positive and statistically significant at 1%, confirming the complementary 𝜌13
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relationship between the formal and informal markets. The result is consistent with the conclusions 
of Awunyo-Vitor and Abankwah (2012) and Thu et al. (2020) that the informal credit market has a 
complementary nexus with the formal credit market. Similarly, the positive, significant correlation 
between households' probability of demanding semi-formal and informal credit indicates informal 
credit and semi-formal credit are complementary. However, the value of  (0.212) is much lower 𝜌23
than  (0.7), indicating that the relationship between informal and semi-formal credit is weaker 𝜌13
than that between formal and informal credit. The coefficient  is positive (with small value) and 𝜌12
not statistically significant, implying that the complementary relationship between formal and semi-
formal credit is unclear. This might be because of the differences in the target client groups of each 
credit market, small value of semi-formal loans, and the limited outreach of semi-formal providers 
(Tran, 2014).
4.2.2. Determinants of agricultural credit demand results
Table 5 displays the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on farm households' credit 
demands. According to Triguero et al. (2014), the coefficients of TVPM indicate the impact of 
explanatory variables on the latent variable (i.e., the household's propensity to have a credit 
demand), whereas the marginal effects report the impact of the explanatory variables on the 
possibility of a positive outcome (i.e., household has a credit demand in one market). Thus, the 
marginal effects are presented in Table 5 rather than coefficients of TVPM to better measure the 
explanatory variables' influence on households' probability of having a credit demand. The variance 
inflation factor (VIF) test results show that the mean VIF and each explanatory variable's VIF are less 
than 10, confirming that the TVPM does not suffer from multicollinearity (VIF results are provided 
upon request). 
Table 5 shows that the Wald test ( 185.56) is significant at 1%, suggesting the overall 𝜒2(54) =
significance of the TVPM. The independence test for households' credit demand in different credit 
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markets (  =  =  = 0) is significant at 1%, confirming the joint significance of the error 𝜌12 𝜌13 𝜌23
correlations. This result suggests that using TVPM is more suitable than univariate probit models. 
Regarding household characteristics, household assets (value of house and durable property), in 
general, are negatively related to a farm household's credit demand for all three credit markets, 
implying that farm households with fewer assets are more likely to rely on credit for agricultural 
purposes. This is consistent with Barslund and Tarp's (2008) result for informal credit demand but 
contrary to the results in Barslund and Tarp (2008) and Mpuga (2010) for formal credit demand, and 
Cheng and Ahmed (2014) for semi-formal and informal credit demand. A possible explanation is that 
households with fewer assets might face economic pressures that lead to a higher demand for credit 
to invest in new agricultural projects to achieve a higher income and accumulate more assets.
Farm size positively affects a farm household's probability of having a formal credit demand. Holding 
other variables constant, a farm household with over a 1000 m2 farmland size is 2% more likely to 
have a formal credit demand. This might be explained by the fact that credit from formal providers is 
primarily used for production (Linh et al., 2019). This supports Barslund and Tarp's (2008) and Cheng 
and Ahmed's (2014) conclusions that farm size has a positive influence on formal credit demand. 
For the household head's characteristics, the head's gender has different effects on the household's 
credit demands in the different credit markets. Table 4 shows that male-headed households are 
8.8% more likely to have formal credit demand than female-headed households. This result supports 
the findings of Zeller (1994) and Chaudhuri and Cherical (2012). On the other hand, male-headed 
households are 5.6% less likely to have semi-formal credit demand than female-headed households. 
The possible explanation is that the semi-formal credit sector attempts to supply financial services to 
specific groups of the population that are excluded from formal financial services, such as the poor 
and women (Tra and Lensink, 2008; Khoi and Gan, 2017). According to Le (2011), semi-formal credit 
providers better serve the poor and women than their formal counterparts.
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The household head's age positively affects the household's probability of having semi-formal and 
informal credit demands. Households whose head is over 45 years are 5.4% and 7.1% more likely to 
have semi-formal and informal credit demand, respectively. This supports Lin et al.'s (2019) 
conclusion that the head's age has a positive effect on informal credit demand. Middle-aged and 
elderly people in rural areas might have little formal education and have more difficulties in applying 
the formal lenders' complicated loan process than the younger people. Thus, older farmers might 
prefer semi-formal and informal credit to formal credit, suggesting segmentation of the credit 
markets. 
The farming experience of the household head has a negative influence on the semi-formal and 
informal credit demand of farm households. Holding other variables constant, farm households with 
one more year of farming activity are 0.6% and 0.4% less likely to demand semi-formal and informal 
credit, respectively. This supports Atieno's (1997) study which shows a significant, negative 
relationship between credit demand and farming experience among Kenya's farm households. This 
result can be explained by the experienced farmers' capability to predict the demand for seasonal 
capital or input price variation, which enables them to reduce their reliance on external finance and 
decrease credit demand (Reyes, 2011).
For credit history-related factors, having a bad credit history significantly, positively affects farm 
households' probability of credit demand in all three credit markets. Households with a bad credit 
history in all three credit markets are 28.1%, 19.7%, and 21.5% more likely to have formal, semi-
formal, and informal credit demand, respectively. A bad credit history indicates that a farm 
household has difficulty in repaying their loans. Thus, they might have credit dema d for new 
agricultural projects with the expectation of gaining more income from new projects to repay bad 
loans.
Geographically, farm households in Hai Duong province are 13.9% and 6.2% less likely to demand 
formal and semi-formal credit, respectively, than those in Ha Nam province (base group). This result 
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indicates that there are regional differences regarding farm households' credit demands. The result 
is consistent with Barslund and Tarp (2008) who show a significant influence of regional differences 
on rural households' credit demands. Interestingly, travelling time to the nearest semi-formal credit 
source significantly, positively affects households' probability of demand for formal and informal 
credit. Time to travel to the closest semi-formal credit source might indicate the availability of semi-
formal credit and the transport costs (especially when farmers need to travel multiple times to 
complete the loan applications). Holding other variables constant, one minute increase in travelling 
time to the nearest semi-formal credit source increases a household's likelihood of having a demand 
for formal and informal credit by 0.5%. This implies that if the cost of borrowing from the semi-
formal credit market increases, farm households may consider more formal or informal credit.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
5.1. Conclusions
Using primary, cross-sectional data gathered from smallholder farmers in the RRD, Vietnam, this 
study simultaneously explores the nexus among formal, semi-formal, and informal credit markets, 
and credit demand determinants. The joint significance of the correlations among credit demand in 
different credit markets is confirmed, supporting the use of the trivariate probit model. The results 
show the complementary relationships between two pairs of credit markets: formal versus informal 
and semi-formal versus informal. The relationship between the formal and semi-formal credit 
markets is positive but not statistically significant. Besides, there are dissimilarities among the 
determinants (household characteristics, household head's characteristics, credit history, and 
geographical factors) of farm households' credit demands in different markets, reflecting 
segmentation of Vietnam credit markets.
5.2. Policy implications
In Vietnam, the informal credit market is still underdeveloped and remains largely neglected by 
policymakers. However, this study shows the complementary relationships between informal and 
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formal credit markets as well as between informal and semi-formal credit markets. These results 
indicate that the growth of the informal market does not hinder the development of the formal and 
semi-formal credit markets. Therefore, the government should reassess the importance of the 
informal credit providers and launch new policies to integrate the informal sector with semi-formal 
and formal sectors to form a more efficient and cohesive rural credit market rather than trying to 
shrink the informal sector (Khoi et al., 2013; Tran et al., 2016). Besides, the government should 
support the establishment of legal advisory organizations at the village level to help farmers to 
prepare loan contracts with informal lenders, ensuring compliance with legal regulations and 
minimizing risks to both farmers and lenders. 
The relationship between the semi-formal and formal credit markets is not statistically significant, 
reflecting the fragmentation and lack of interaction between these markets. Therefore, the 
government should focus on policies to expand the outreach of semi-formal lenders and provide 
training programs for rural households to understand the differences in loan procedures, interest 
rates, and collateral requirements between the formal and semi-formal credit markets.
Results from the TVPM show that disadvantaged farm households (such as households with fewer 
assets) are more likely to have credit demand. However, these households often lack access to credit 
because of the low value of the collateral (Linh et al., 2019). Thus, the government should revise the 
policies to create incentives and reduce the risks for formal credit institutions when granting 
uncollateralized credit, such as exempting corporate income tax for these loans and offering a local 
government guarantee to replace farm households' physical collateral. Besides, formal credit 
institutions should focus more on providing collateral-free credit to the joint liability group of 
farmers with clear-specified joint liability for group members.
Female-headed farm households are more likely to demand semi-formal credit, indicating that the 
semi-formal credit sector supports the formal credit sector to increase credit accessibility for 
disadvantaged groups of borrowers (such as women). However, the semi-formal credit market is still 
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small with limited coverage (Truong et al., 2020). This issue originates from both policy-related 
aspects (e.g., not able to access commercial funding) and the semi-formal credit providers 
themselves (limited human resources, technology, poor governance, etc.) (Bui, 2017). Thus, it is 
important for the government to revise and amend related policies to create a more favorable 
environment for the development of the semi-formal credit market. In addition, the government 
should provide management and technology training programs for semi-formal credit providers to 
enhance their management and governance practices. 
Farm households with a bad credit history have a higher probability of demanding credit. A bad 
credit history indicates the poor repayment reputation of farm households, and lenders might be 
reluctant to grant these households credit despite how good their agricultural projects might be. 
Thus, these households' access to credit is more restricted. To deal with this issue, the government 
should focus on improving the insurance market for agricultural production to reduce the risks for 
both farm households and credit providers. Additionally, credit providers should be encouraged to 
pay more attention to and carefully analyze new agricultural projects of farm households with a bad 
credit history rather than heavily rely on their reputation. 
5.3. Research limitations and future studies
The study only investigates the determinants of one aspect of credit demand (i.e., whether farm 
households need credit for agricultural purposes or not) and does not examine the factors affecting 
the amount of credit demand. Besides, the interrelationships of credit demand among different 
credit markets and credit demand determinants may vary across different farming regions. 
Therefore, future studies should include the investigation of determinants of credit demand amount 
and expand the research areas outside the RRD region for a better understanding of farm 
households' credit demand in Vietnam.
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Table 1: Definitions of the model variables 
Variables Explanations
DC1 1 if household has formal credit demand, 0 otherwise
DC2 1 if household has semi-formal credit demand, 0 otherwise
Type of credit 
demand
DC3 1 if household has informal credit demand, 0 otherwise
Familysize Number of people in household 
Houseval 1 if house value > 300 million VND, 0 otherwise
Durableval 1 if durable properties’ value > 50 million VND, 0 otherwise
Farmlandsize Farmland size (m2)
Socstatus 1 if the head holds any position in community, 0 otherwise
Socecogroup Number of socio-economic groups the head joins
Household’s 
characteristics
Mainagrincome 1 if primary farm production is livestock, 0 otherwise
Hgender 1 if the head is man, 0 otherwise
Hage 1 if the head is more than 45 years old, 0 otherwise




Farmexpe Years of the head’s farming experience 
Badhisfor 1 if the household could not repay loans or had formal loans 
restructured in past 3 years, 0 otherwise
Badhissemi 1 if the household could not repay loans or had semi-formal loans 
restructured in past 3 years, 0 otherwise
Credit history
Badhisinfor 1 if the household could not repay loans or had informal loans 
restructured in past 3 years, 0 otherwise
Fortime Length of time to the closest formal credit provider (minutes)
Semitime Length of time to the closest semi-formal credit provider (minutes)
HAN 1 if farm locates in Ha Noi, 0 otherwise
Geographical 
factors
HAID 1 if farm locates in Hai Duong, 0 otherwise
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- - - 305 47.07%
Yes - - 174 26.85%
- Yes - 48 7.41%
- - Yes 9 1.39%
Yes Yes - 27 4.17%
Yes - Yes 59 9.10%
- Yes Yes 3 0.46%
Yes Yes Yes 23 3.55%
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Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Familysize 4.69 (1.3) 4.72 (1.19) 4.62 (1.09) 4.66 (1.18)
Houseval 0.76 (0.43) 0.71 (0.46) 0.56 (0.5) 0.59 (0.5)









Socstatus 0.1 (0.3) 0.13 (0.34) 0.08 (0.27) 0.05 (0.23)
Socecogroup 1.21 (1.05) 1.19 (1.01) 0.99 (0.84) 0.95 (0.88)
Household’s 
characteristics
Mainagrincome 0.47 (0.5) 0.47 (0.5) 0.48 (0.5) 0.38 (0.49)
Hgender 0.7 (0.46) 0.75 (0.43) 0.6 (0.49) 0.72 (0.45)
Hage 0.39 (0.49) 0.4 (0.49) 0.42 (0.5) 0.44 (0.5)




Farmexpe 15.23 (8.7) 14.9 (8.49) 12.34 (6.98) 12.37 (7.65)
Badhisfor 0.08 (0.27) 0.13 (0.33) 0.1 (0.3) 0.19 (0.4)
Badhissemi 0.03 (0.17) 0.04 (0.19) 0.11 (0.31) 0.05 (0.23)
Credit history
Badhisinfor 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.14) 0.07 (0.26)
Fortime 20.06 (11.22) 20.73 (11.55) 20.89 (10.15) 21.28 (11.9)
Semitime 17.41 (10.45) 18.78 (10.79) 18.9 (12.02) 21.78 (12.91)
HAN 0.33 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.27 (0.44) 0.31 (0.46)
HAID 0.33 (0.47) 0.27 (0.45) 0.25 (0.43) 0.36 (0.48)
Geographical 
factors
Ha Nam (base 
group)
0.34 (0.47) 0.41 (0.49) 0.49 (0.5) 0.33 (0.47)
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Notes: ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; standard errors are in parentheses.
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Informal credit demand 
(DC3)
Familysize 0.004 (0.015) 0.007 (0.011) -0.004 (0.011)
Houseval -0.089* (0.045) -0.087*** (0.03) -0.067** (0.03)
Durableval -0.062 (0.039) -0.062** (0.029) -0.05* (0.028)
Farmlandsize 0.00002*** (0.000004) -0.0000002 (0.000003) 0.000003 (0.000003)
Socstatus 0.072 (0.062) 0.018 (0.048) -0.048 (0.05)
Socecogroup -0.02 (0.019) -0.02 (0.015) -0.021 (0.014)
Household’s 
characteristics
Mainagrincome 0.004 (0.039) 0.021 (0.028) -0.039 (0.027)
Hgender 0.088** (0.041) -0.056* (0.028) 0.009 (0.029)
Hage 0.04 (0.044) 0.054* (0.031) 0.071** (0.03)




Farmexpe -0.001 (0.003) -0.006*** (0.002) -0.004** (0.002)
Badhisfor 0.281*** (0.071) -0.06 (0.053) 0.065 (0.045)
Badhissemi 0.031 (0.108) 0.197*** (0.062) 0.029 (0.068)
Credit history
Badhisinfor -0.107 (0.147) -0.029 (0.096) 0.215** (0.087)
Fortime -0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
Semitime 0.005** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001)
HAN -0.06 (0.047) -0.039 (0.034) 0.008 (0.033)
Geographical 
factors
HAID -0.139*** (0.046) -0.062* (0.034) 0.004 (0.032)
Log likelihood -838.0183
LR chi2(54) 185.56***
Test of  =  =  = 0 (chi2(3))  𝜌12 𝜌13 𝜌23 86.7557***
Number of obs. 648
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Page 28 of 28International Journal of Social Economics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
View publication stats
